I am working on the following two projects:
- My first project is to
consider whether an individual's non-cognitive mental states can play a role in
contributing to the epistemic justification of his or her beliefs. Many philosophers
believe that they cannot, but this view seems counterintuitive to me.
For instance, it seems to me that my feelings of hunger help justify my
belief that I am hungry. So I am interested in thinking
about which noncognitive mental states can contribute to the epistemic
justification of our beliefs and about how they can contribute.
- My second project is to consider whether a person can be epistemically justified in having an attitude other than a
belief, and, if so, which sorts of attitudes a person can be epistemically
justified in having. I would like to compare the
justification of beliefs to the justification of other types of attitudes and
think about which problems are unique to the latter. I hope to survey the major views on the nature of epistemic justification and think about
which of the various conditions it is/isn’t possible for attitudes to satisfy
and about the degree to which attitudes can satisfy these various conditions.