In the recent work on seemings (or appearances), philosophers often suggest that seemings can be sorted into different categories. For instance, some species of seemings philosophers have recognized include perceptual, memory-based, intellectual, introspective, ethical, and emotional seemings. However, philosophers have not spent a great deal of time explaining why they draw the distinctions that they do. Recently, I have been trying to develop a more fine-grained understanding of how the various species differ from one another-- to identify the distinguishing characteristics of each kind of seeming. 

I am interested in this topic because my primary objective in my dissertation is to delineate the range of cases in which emotional seemings can contribute to epistemic justification. Emotional seemings have sometimes been considered less trustworthy than other kinds of seemings. A natural question to ask is whether there is a good reason to privilege some kinds of seemings over others. So I am interested in the following questions: What are the epistemically relevant differences between species of seemings that justify such discrimination? Why should some kinds of seemings confer an epistemic advantage that other species do not? 

Thus, I hope that identifying the similarities and differences between kinds of seemings will put me in a better position to judge whether emotional seemings can contribute to justification, how emotional seemings contribute to justification, and which kinds of beliefs emotional seemings are capable of justifying.